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RIGHTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CREDITORS
IN PROPERTY UNAVAILABLE TO THE DEBTOR
WHEN SATISFACTION cannot be obtained out of the general assets of a
debtor, creditors will often attempt to realize on claims which are not avail-
able to the debtor himself. Some of these claims arise out of transactions
which injure debtor and creditors alike; others grow out of dealings which
work injury only to creditors. While in appropriate circumstances these
transactions will give rise to a cause of action,1 that cause of action will be
vested not in all creditors, but only in those who are deemed to be injured.
For the purposes of this comment it will be assumed that all of the other
elements of recovery are present; an attempt will then be made to determine
what sort of creditor may, and what sort may not, realize on the various
claims unavailable to the debtor.2 Further investigation will be made of the
assertion of such claims by a representative of creditors; for on such occa-
sions similar questions are raised, though they are framed in terms of the
extent of the representative's recovery, and the methods of distributing the
recaptured property.
A creditor who attempts to recover on claims unavailable to the debtor
will normally rely on one of two theories. In situations falling under the
first theory the debtor appears to be in command of greater resources than
are actually at his disposal-a misleading impression that is created through
the complicity, or at least passive acquiescence, of a third party. The basis
of recovery, then, will be that credit was extended in reliance on the mis-
representations attributable to that party. Accordingly the creditor will have
to show as a minimum that he extended credit subsequent to the creation
and. prior to the termination of the appearance of greater resources; and
any actual knowledge of the true state of the debtor's affairs will preclude
recovery.
In transactions of the second type-broadly classified as fraudulent con-
veyances-the debtor has in some way dissipated his assets. The basis of
the cause of action will be that creditors have been deprived of some assets
which were available to satisfy their claims. But this theory will grant pro-
tection only to creditors whose claims were in existence at the time of the
transaction; creditors who extended credit to a debtor with already depleted
assets cannot ordinarily recover. Such creditors will be granted a right of
action only if they are able to show that the debtor intended to defraud them
1. See, generally, materials cited in notes 6, 10, 13, 40, 57, infra.
2. Some of the fact situations dealt with can involve only corporate debtors. In
order to insure the validity of the comparisons made, cases involving such debtors have
been used in all situations as far as possible. But since such cases are not everywhere
to be found, it has been thought best not expressly to limit the subject-matter of the
comment to corporate debtors.
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-a theory of recovery somewhat similar to that advanced in the "apparent
ownership" cases.
Aside from these general theories, one other factor may operate to dis-
criminate between creditors. It is usually said that, before making a claim
which is unavailable to the debtor, the creditor must have exhausted his
remedies against the general assets.3 But this requisite does not make for
any fundamental distinction between creditors; rather it imposes a procedural
obstacle which any creditor can normally surmount. In any case the "ex-
haustion" requirement has received a liberal interpretation with comparative
uniformity; wherever it seemed superfluous, it has been relaxed.4 In some-
what the same way the courts have searched out ways of avoiding the general
theoretical requirements in cases of apparent merit. But far from achieving
uniformity in this respect, the methods of escape have varied not only with
particular courts, but with the particular transaction as well. The types of
creditors who may recover can thus be determined only by an examination
of each of the more commonly recurring claims.
Since property subject to a mortgage or conditional sale agreement is
generally retained in the possession of the debtor, he may appear to be en-
dowed with the attributes of complete ownership. Creditors who assert that
they have extended credit on the faith of this apparent ownership may attempt
to avoid the mortgage on the ground that the mortgagee was a party to the
deception. Since a claim of this nature could conceivably be made wherever
a debtor's property was mortgaged, recording statutes were evolved to define
the rights of the parties more precisely.t The reliance theory runs through
these statutes, but only in incomplete form. Thus when a mortgage is duly
recorded, recovery by creditors is precluded; recordation is deemed to con-
vey knowledge to all the world and thus to negate any intent to deceive as
3. Braun v. American Laundry Mach. Co., 56 F. (2d) 197 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
Strictly this rule requires that the creditor obtain a judgment against the debtor and that
execution be returned unsatisfied. Hannan v. Hardee, 69 F. (2d) 394 (App. D. C. 1934).
4. Gaskins v. Bonfils, 8 F. Supp. 832 (D. Colo. 1934). Thus insolvency of the
debtor generally obviates the requirement. Williams' Ex'r v. Chamberlain, 123 Ky. 150,
94 S. IV. 29 (1906). Likewise a trustee in bankruptcy need not prove that he represents
judgment creditors. Williams v. Browstein, I F. (2d) 470 (D. Me. 1924) ; Union Trust
Co. v. Amery, 67 Wash. 1, 120 Pac. 539 (1912). The same may be true of a state court
receiver. See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq. 36, 61 Ati. 843 (Ch. 1905) ; cf. Cooney Co.
v. Arlington Hotel Co., 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 At. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1918). But cf. Sharp v.
Hawks, 80 F. (2d) 731 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (federal court receiver) ; Commerce Trust
Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F. (2d) 478, 488 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935). And a trustee should not
have to allege exhaustion of corporate assets. Benner v. Billings, 107 Wash. 1, 181 Pac.
19 (1919). For the effect of the Amendment of 1910 to § 47(a) of the Bankruptcy Act,
see McLean v. Green, 171 Miss. 183, 157 So. 251 (1934). Under the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act even a judgment is not necessary before a creditor may move to set
aside a fraudulent transfer as there defined. American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N. Y.
1, 166 N. E. 783 (1929); see Glenn, The Uniform Fraudulent Corveyoance Act; Rights
of Creditor Without Judgment (1930) 30 Cot.. I 1Ev. 202.
5. See VLsH, MOrTGAGES (1934) § 28 et seq.; cf. Comment (1928) 37 YAve L. J.
494.
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well as the possibility of reliance.8 When the mortgage is not recorded, re-
covery is still limited to those who could possibly have relied. Accordingly
a creditor must show that his claim arose after the mortgage was executed
and before it was recorded. But once this is demonstrated, no further proof
of reliance is necessary ;7 the creditor will be automatically protected unless
there is a showing that he knew of the mortgage agreement. Further statutory
delimitation of the right to recover bears no relation to the reliance theory; this
may be said of the requirement in the majority of statutes that a lien be
acquired before recordation.8 And completely inconsistent with the theory
is the occasional decision holding a mortgage invalid as against a creditor
whose claim arose before the agreement was made, but who obtained a lien
in the period between the execution of the agreement and its recordation.,
Closely related to the unrecorded mortgage is the type of situation where
the debtor is in apparent ownership of property, though he is under an
equitable or even moral obligation to transfer it to the real owner. Such
obligations can not be recorded; and if the equitable owner has allowed the
debtor to treat the property as his so as to invite credit on that basis, creditors
who "relied" on this representation may be able to make a good claim against
the property.1 0 But unlike the case of the unrecorded mortgage, where the
mere failure to record is sufficient to give rise to a general right of recovery,
there must be an actual showing of the specific acts or omissions of the
equitable owner tending to reveal bad faith and to put the debtor in appar-
ently complete ownership. 1 Once the general cause of action has been estab-
lished, distinctions are made between creditors purely on' a basis of possible
reliance. So long as a claimant has shown that he extended credit after the
creation and before the termination of the equitable obligation, no proof of
actual reliance will be required.1 2
6. See Comment (1919) 28 Ywt L. J. 685.
7. Becker Co. v. Gill, 206 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 8th, 1913); Townsend v. Ashepoo Fer-
tilizer Co., 212 Fed. 97 (C. C.A. 4th, 1914); Ruggles v. Cannedy, 127 Cal. 290, 53 Pac.
911, 59 Pac. 827 (1899); Klingensmith v. Clow & Sons, 273 Mich. 48, 262 N. W. 644
(1935); American Multigraph Sales Co. v. Jones, 58 Wash. 619, 109 Pac. 103 (1910);
Ryan Drug Co. v. Hvambsahl, 89 Wis. 61, 61 N. W. 299 (1894).
8. Morey & Co. v. Schaad, 98 N. J. L. 799, 121 Atl. 622 (1923); see UNIOrO
CONDITIONAL SALF-S AcT § 5; UNIFORM CHATTEL MORTGAGE AcT § 42-2 (not yet adopted
in any state). If bankruptcy proceedings are instituted before the recordation of the
mortgage, the trustee, as a lien creditor, may set the mortgage aside. In re Master Knit-
ting Corp., 7 F. (2d) 11 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); In re Frost, 12 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 6th,
1926); In re Douglas Lumber Co., 2 F. (2d) 985 (D. Wyo. 1924); cf. Olson & Co. v.
Voorhees, 292 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) (receiver).
9. Cardenas v. Miller, 108 Cal. 250, 39 Pac. 783, 41 Pac. 472 (1895). But cf. Born-
stein & Sons v. Allen, 127 Wash. 314, 220 Pac. 801 (1923) (prior creditor not protected).
10. See, generally, Carey and Cilella, Protection of Creditors by Estoppel (1935)
29 Im.. L. REv. 1000.
11. See id. at 1015-1017.
12. Actual reliance occasionally appears, without any suggestion as to its necessity,
Hart v. Casterton, 56 N. D. 581, 218 N. W. 644 (1928). In one case, however, it is
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Another general type of claim theoretically available only to relying credi-
tors is that against the holder of watered stock.13 Stock is said to be watered
when it has been issued as fully paid, though not so paid." In such cases
the paid-in capital does not equal the represented capital, and each stockholder
is said to be a party to the misrepresentation to the extent of the unpaid
balance on his stock.15 Creditors who have "relied" on this representation
will be able to recover from the holders of watered stock.10 Under this theory
of recovery the creditor's claim must, of course, have arisen subsequently
to the issuance of stock ;17 a creditor existing at the time is said not to be preju-
diced, since the assets were not depleted. If the creditor has proved subse-
quency, courts follow the tendency of the recording statutes by generally
presuming reliance.18 Whether or not this presumption is expressly recog-
nized, no case has been found where any evidence was required that the
creditor actually relied on, or even knew of, the corporation's stated paid-up
arguable that the court denied recovery because no reliance was shovn. Bergin v. Black-
wood, 141 Minn. 325, 170 N. IV. 503 (1919).
13. See, generally, Bonbright, Stockholders' Defenses Against Liability to Creditors
on Watered Stock (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 403; Comments (1936) 35 Micir. L Rlav. 103;
(1929) 17 CALIr. L. REv. 290.
14. It is largely immaterial whether the stock was issued for no consideration, as
by way of bonus [Stoecker v. Goodman, 183 Ky. 330, 209 S. W. 374 (1919)], or for a
payment of a certain percentage of par [Vermont Marble Co. v. Dedez Granite Co., 135
Cal. 579, 67 Pac. 1057 (1902)], or in return for property which is grossly overvalued.
Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S. NV. 644 (1902). But it has been held that stock which
is issued for no consideration at all is wholly void and the holder of it not liable. Hirsh-
feld v. McKinley, 78 F. (2d) 124 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935), (1936) 3 U. OF CUL L Rrv. 331.
The more reasonable rule seems to be that the creditor must prove that par value was
not paid. Yardley v. Caruthersville Motor Co., 225 Mo. App. 321, 35 S. IV. (2d) 971
(1931); Thomas v. Scoutt, 115 Neb. 343, 215 N. NV. 140 (1927). Contra: Ryerson &
Son v. Peden, 303 Ill. 171, 135 N. E. 423 (1922); Goff v. Goff & Co.'s Assignee, 257
Ky. 519, 78 S. W. (2d) 758 (1935). In the case of no-par stock the deficiency is the
difference between the amount stated to have been and the amount actually paid in. Liv-
ingston v. Adams, 226 Mo. App. 824, 43 S. W. (2d) 836 (1931). Theories as to the
proper measure of deficiency vary widely. Compare Strickland v. Washington Bldg.
Corp., 287 I1. App. 340, 4 N. E. (2d) 973 (1936) ("actual value" rule), with Krebs v.
Oberrender, 274 Pa. 154, 118 At. 19 (1922) ("good faith" rule); see, generally, State
Trust Co. v. Turner, 111 Iowa 664, 82 N. IV. 1029 (1900); 2 BoNDRIGHT, TU VALUA-
TION OF PROPERTY (1937) 790-810.
15. Accordingly the stockholder must have knowledge that the stock is not fully paid.
Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., 184 Cal. 367, 194 Pac. 11 (1920). Generally there must be at
least a showing that the stockholder bought directly from the corporation. Gray Const. Co.
v. Fantle, 62 S. D. 345, 253 N. V. 464 (1934). But cf. Shugart v. Maytag, 188 Iowa 916,
176 N. IV. 886 (1920). Where an innocent transferee of stock is protected, the transferor
with knowledge may be liable. Enright v. Heckscher, 240 Fed. 863 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
16. Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co., 43 Minn. 174, 50 N. NV. 1117 (1892).
17. Handley v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (1891); Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119
U. S. 343 (1886).
18. Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891) ; see See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N. J. Eq.
36, 84, 61 Atl. 843, 862 (Ch. 1905); cf. Lex v. Selay Steel Corp., 203 Iowa 792, 814,
206 N. W. 586, 596 (1925).
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capital.10 Instead the burden of proof is upon the defendant stockholder to
tegative reliance by showing that the creditor knew of the stock watering.20
Though there is a wide divergence, courts are generally slow to find know-
ledge. Since it will normally be difficult to furnish incontrovertible proof of
actual knowledge, inferences must be drawn from surrounding circumstances.
Thus, as might be expected, the courts deny recovery where the creditor was
a promoter of the corporation or its attorney,2 ' and generally where he was
a director or himself a holder of watered stock.22 On occasion an accurate
public record of the corporation's affairs, like a recorded mortgage, has been
declared to put creditors on notice.2 But knowledge will not be inferred
from general familiarity with the corporation 26 or from many years' dealings
with notoriously over-capitalized corporations such as wildcat oil producers. 23
19. Where it was not possible for the creditor to have acted in reliance, however,
recovery has been denied, as where the debtor corporation was the assignee of a lease-
hold and the creditor was the lessor. Bobb v. Walmar Theater Co., 206 Mo. App. 236,
227 S. W. 841 (1921). Tort creditors would fall in this category, but may be allowed to
recover if the right of action on watered stock is based on a statute. Kelly v. Fourth of
July Mining Co., 21 Mont. 291, 53 Pac. 959 (1898); cf. cases cited in note 30, infro. Such
creditors might not be barred in the unrecorded mortgage situations, since the statutory
requirement of subsequeticy is there purely mechanical. See note 7, supra.
20. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cotton Exchange Real Estate Co., 46 Fed.
n (C: C. E. D. Mo. 1891) ; Scott v. Barton, 285 Mo. 427, 226 S. IV. 958 (1920) ; Smith
v. Schm tt, 112 Ore. 687, 231 Pac. 176 (1924). Contra: Colville Valley Coal Co. v.
Rogers, 123 Wash. 36% 212 Pac. 732 (1923).
21. Promoter: Martin v. South Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28, 26 S. E. 591 (1896);
ci. Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 170 N.Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't 1918).
Attormy: Johnson v. Tennessee Oil Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 32, 69 Atl. 788 (Ch. 1903).
22. Reel v. Brammer, 56 Ind. App. 180, 101 N. F. 1043 (1913); Miller v. Higgin-
botha'ds Adm'r, 29 Ky. L 547, 93 S. W. 655 (190S); Biggs v. Westcn, 248 Mo. 333,
154 S. W. 708 (1913). But sometimes even a stockholder who sold overvalued prop-
erty to the corporation in return for stock may not be held to notice of the deal. Martin
v. South Salem Land Co., 94 Va. 28, 26 S. E. 591 (1896); ct. Stoecker v. Goodman, 183
Ky. 33D), 209 S. W. 374 (1919).
Rulea for the imputation of the knowledge of its officers to a creditor corporation are
orthodox. Sherman v. Harley, 178 Cal. 584, 174 Pac. 901 (1918); First Nat. Bank of
Chanute v. Northrup, 82 Kan. 638, 109 Pac. 672 (1910); cf. Watt v. German Savings
Bank, 183 Iowa 346, 165 N. W. 897 (1917).
23. Bent v. Underdown, 156 Ind. 516, 60 N. E. 307 (1901) (articles of association).
But ci. Stout v. Hubbell, 104 Iowa 499, 73 N. W. 1060 (1898).
24. See cases cited note 25, infra. But cf. Farrell v. Davis, 85 Ore. 213, 161 Pac.
94 (1916).
25. One company repeatedly claimed it had been deceived by such companies. Cali-
fornia National Supply Co. v. Black, 48 Cal. App. 122, 191 Pac. 715 (1920); Cal. Nat.
Sup. Co. v. O'Brien, 51 Cal. App. 606, 197 Pac. 414 (1921); Cal. Nat. Sup. Co. v. Dins-
more, 52 Cal. App. 513, 199 Pac. 552 (1921). Occasionally, however, mining companies
have been treated as in a special class. In re South Mountain Consolidated Mining Co.,
5 Fed. 403 (C. C. D. Cal. 1881) ; Ross v. Silver & Copper Island Min. Co., 36 Minn. 38, 29
N. W. 591 (1886). But cf. Kelly v. Fourth of July Min. Co., 21 Mont. 291, 53 Pac. 959
(1898).
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The reluctance of the courts to find knowledge perhaps reflects the decadence
of the reliance theory.
While the rigor of the reliance rule has been relaxed, it will at least operate
to deny recovery to already existing creditors, and to those who are deemed
to have -knowledge. By resort to varied devices even such creditors have
sometimes been able to induce courts to allow them recovery. Most frequently
these attempts have taken the direction of framing the case in terms of an
action to collect unpaid subscriptions. Such claims are of course available
to the corporation,2 and a creditor recovering from a stockholder on this
basis does so in the corporation's right.27 Any creditor, existing as well as
subsequent, with or without knowledge, may bring the action.28 Accordingly,
at least three jurisdictions have allowed creditors who knew of or even
participated in the stock watering to recover by the simple expedient of
holding an agreement to consider part payment as full payment void as
against the corporation.- This leaves the full subscription obligation in force
and available to any creditor. A similar result has been obtained elsewhere,
without declaring such agreements void as to the corporation, by a judicious
application of ordinary statutes requiring capital stock to be paid up. Stock-
holders are held to be unable by any agreements with the corporation to
avoid their obligation to creditors to pay the full amount of the stoclc. ' A
different expedient for the existing creditor may be found when promoters
have made substantial profits by selling property to the debtor corporation
at inflated values, in return for corporate securities. Although earlier indica-
tions were unfavorable, 31 it is definitely the import of the recent case of
26. See, generally, Comment (1935) 33 Thcir. L. REv. 1059.
27. Geigy Co. v. Wilfling, 50 R. I. 506, 149 At. 609 (1930). Thus where the cor-
poration's right is barred, as by the Statute of Limitations, the creditor may be helpless.
Hawkins v. Donnerberg, 40 Ore. 97, 66 Pac. 691 (1901); Spencer v. Anderson, 193 Cal.
1, 222 Pac. 355 (1924).
28. Thielsen v. Linde, 127 Ore. 639, 271 Pac. 933 (1928); see Sprague v. Nat. Bank=
of America, 172 Ill. 149, 168, 50 N. E. 19, 26 (1898).
But in certain unpaid subscription cases, where the stockholder might have had a good
defense against the corporation which he cannot assert against the creditor, the type of
creditor involved becomes relevant. Lex v. Seiway Steel Corp., 203 Iovra 792, 206 N. IV.
586 (1925) (subscription agreement subject to rescission unknown to subsequent cred-
itor) ; cf. Butts v. King, 101 Conn. 291, 125 At. 654 (1924) (novation of subscription
obligation, like fraudulent transfer, ineffective as against existing creditor).
29. Rosoff v. Gilbert Transportation Co., 221 Fed. 972 (D. Conn. 1915) ; Cooney Co.
v. Arlington Hotel Co., 11 Del. Ch. 430, 106 At. 39 (Sup. Ct. 1918); Easton Nat. Bank
v. Amer. Brick & Tile Co., 70 N. J. Eq. 732, 64 Ad. 917 (1906).
30. Frink v. Carman Distributing Co., 97 Colo. 211, 48 P. (2d) E05 (1935) ; Stoecker
v. Goodman, 183 Ky. 330, 209 S. NV. 374 (1919) ; Gillett v. Chicago Tide & Trust Co.,
230 Ill. 373, 82 N. E. 891 (1907); cf. Clark v. Tompkins, 205 Cal. 373, 270 Pac. 946
(1928) ; Bottlers' Seal Co. v. Rainey, 243 N. Y. 333, 153 N. E. 437 (1926).
31. Priest v. White, 89 Mo. 609, 1 S. IV. 361 (1886) ; see Banque Franco-Egyptienne
y. Brown, 34 Fed. 162, 196 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1883); Allenhurst Park Estates, Inc. v.
Smith, 101 N. J. Eq. 581, 596, 138 Ad. 709, 716 (Ch. 1927).
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McCandless v. Furlaud32 that creditors may recover from the promoters, at
least through a receiver, and that existing creditors are in the more favorable
position. This alternative is of course available only as against promoters,
who, in any case, have intricate defenses available.0 One further possibility
for avoiding the discrimination against existing creditors might lie in the
use of the so-called trust fund doctrine. As originally stated, the doctrine
declared the capital stock of a corporation to be a trust fund for all credi-
tors." Definitely discredited, at least in this unqualified form,35 it still
occasions considerable confusion, for it persistently reappears in the cases"0
though apparently only as a substitute for the reliance theory.31 But since
unpaid subscriptions are considered as capital for purposes of this theory,30
it might conceivably be argued that a loss of this "fund" by agreements with
stockholders would give a right of action to all creditors. No court has as
yet adopted this rationale.
When a transaction is regarded by the courts as something akin to a
fraudulent conveyance, the right of action is limited to existing creditors
unless an intent to defraud subsequent creditors can be shown. 0 But many
of the transactions that are treated as fraudulent conveyances to some extent
resemble the issuance of watered stock. This is especially true of the first
type of transaction to be considered, the repurchase of stock by the cor-
poration.40 Repurchase may be effected either by payment of cash, or by
the cancellation of unpaid subscription balances, or by the issuance of secured
or unsecured obligations.- The rights of various creditors to void these trans-
actions may thus arise either when the creditors attempt to recover from the
stockholders,41 or to collect the subscriptions,42 or when the stockholders
32. 296 U. S. 140 (1935), (1936) 49 HaRv. L. REv. 785.
33. See, generally, Comment (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 511.
34. See Story, J., in Wood v. Dummer, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 17,944 (C. C. D. Me.
1824); Hunt, The Trust Fund Theory and Some Substitutes for It (1902) 12 YALE
L.j.63.
35. Coit v. Gold Amalgamating Co., 119 U. S. 343 (1886); Hospes v. Northwestern
Mfg. & Car Co., 48 Minn. 174, 50 N. W. 1117 (1892); cf. McDonald v. Williams, 174
U. S. 397 (1899); O'Bear Jewelry Co. v. Volfer, 106 Ala. 205, 17 So. 525 (1895).
36. This is true throughout the field of this Comment. See, e.g., Valhalla Memorial
Park Co. v. Lowry, 209 Ind. 423, 428, 199 N. E. 247, 249 (1936); cf. notes 51, 54, 65,
infra.
37. E.g., Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., 184 Cal. 367, 194 Pac. 11 (1920); Courtney v.
Youngs, 202 Mich. 384, 168 N. W. 441 (1918) ; Johnson v. Tennessee Oil Co., 74 N. J.
Eq. 32, 69 AtI. 788 (Ch. 1908).
38. See Fogg v. Blair, 139 U. S. 118, 125 (1891); Forcum v. Symmes, 106 Fla.
510, 514, 143 So. 630, 632 (1932) ; cf. Wagner v. Fisenmenger, 65 S.W. (2d) 108 (Mo.
App. 1933).
39. See, generally, GrNN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES (1931) 423-466.
40. See Comment (1936) 20 MiNx. L. REv. 422; (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1128.
41. E.g., Lefker v. Harner, 123 Ark. 575, 186 S. W. 75 (1916); Atlanta & Wal-
worth Butter & Cheese Ass'n v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. W. 106 (1909); Union
Trust Co. v. Amery, 67 Wash. 1, 120 Pac. 539 (1912).
42. E.g., Alabama Terminal & Improvement Co. v. Hall & Farley, 152 Ala, 262, 44
So. 592 (1907); Forcum v. Symmes, 106 Fla. 510, 143 So. 630 (1932).
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seek to enforce the corporate obligations in bankruptcy or receivership over
the protest of creditors. 43 Such transactions are not invalid as against the
creditor,4 4 unless the corporation was insolvent at the time or the transaction
rendered it so.45
Under the prevailing notion stock repurchases are treated as fraudulent
conveyances. Attacks may be made only by existing creditors,40 unless actual
intent to defraud subsequent creditors is shown. Of course even existing
creditors who knew of or participated in the transaction may be estopped
from complaining of the dissipation of the corporate assets.4T Though re-
covery is generally limited to the existing creditor, a substantial number
of courts have found ways to grant the subsequent creditor a remedy. Thus
courts have occasionally resorted to the expedient of finding repurchase agree-
merits ultra vires and unenforceable. 48 This device may be resorted to only
when the repurchase agreement is still executory, but other contrivances
used by the courts have a broader application. Sometimes courts have
slurred over the elements of the cause of action and have seemed to suggest
that the status of the creditor as existing and the corporation's insolvency
43. E.g., Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 ( C. A. 6th, 1916); Campb-ll v. Grant
Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267 (1932).
44. If the corporation is solvent it may repurchase its own stock. See Wormser, The
Power of a Corporation to Acquire Its Own Stock (1915) 24 YAn L. J. 177. But cf.
In re Burnet-Clark Ltd., 56 F. (2d) 744, 747 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The English rule is
to the contrary. Trevor v. Whitworth, 12 App. Cas. 409 (1837). Althoujh probably
fallacious, the argument has been made that a contract for repurchase is unenforceable for
lack of mutuality since it might be unlawful for the corporation to perform it except out
of surplus. Topken, Loring & Schwartz v. Schwartz, 249 N. Y. 206, 163 N. E. 735
(1928), (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 829. See note 45, infra.
45. Bunker Hill Country Club v. McElhatton, 282 Ill. App. 221 (1935); Campbell
v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267 (1932); see Sanford
v. First Nat. Bank of Marysville, Kan., 238 Fed. 293, 301 (C. C. A. Gth, 1916); but ef.
Marshall v. Fredericksburg Lumber Co., 162 Va. 136, 173 S. E. 553 (1934). A note
given in repurchase is at no time enforceable unless it can be paid out of surplus. In re
Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914). Contra: Campbell v. Grant
Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267 (1932).
46. Durand v. Brown, 236 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) ; Sanford v. First Nat. Bank
of Marysville, Kan., 238 Fed. 298 (C. C A. 8th, 1916); Cohen v. George, 149 Ga. 701,
101 S. E. 803 (1920), Long v. Lynch Enterprise Finance Corp., 39 Ga. App. 221, 146
S. E. 513 (1929); Bunker Hill Country Club v. McElhatton, 282 Il. App. 221 (1935);
Campbell v. Grant Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267 (1932).
47. Cf. Way v. Ruff, 112 Minn. 57, 127 N. NV. 564 (1910) ; see Campbldl v. Grant
Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 176, 182 N. E. 267, 269 (1932). If an estoppel
is not raised the result may be disturbing. For example, on the basis of a strong statute
the Michigan court allowed a bank which had knovingly loaned the corporation money
with which to repurchase its stock to recover from a former stodcholder. First Nat. Bank
of Boyne City v. A. Heller Sawdust Co., 240 Mich. 688, 216 N. IV. 464 (1927) ; see note
50, infra. It was suggested, however, that if the bank also had had knowledge of the cor-
poration's financial condition a different result might have been reached.
48. Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392 (C. C. D. Del. 1897); c.
note 44, supra.
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are alternative allegations, that only one would be sufficientA0 With the
help of perfectly usual statutes50 and the trust fund doctrine, which always
tends to equalize creditors, some courts have simply stated that repurchase
was in fraud of subsequent creditors.5 ' Other courts have allowed subsequent
creditors to recover by giving full effect to the notion of intent to defraud.
Wisconsin, for example, has held that where the contracting parties to the
repurchase agreement contemplated that the sinking corporation would con-
tinue to incur debts as solvent, repurchases were so lacking in good faith
as to supply the actual intent to defraud.52 It vAll be seen that this approaches
the "reliance" concept, and several other courts have found that creditors
were entitled to assume that the capital paid in would not be paid out again
except in the legitimate course of business, and that the stockholder may be
a party to creating this deceptive appearance.5 If this line of argument is
used in a case where the corporation sought merely to cancel its right to
collect subscriptions, the case becomes almost indistinguishable from a typical
watered stock case, and properly so. For no apparent reason, however, the
courts are reluctant to use the reliance doctrine explicitly; seemingly they
prefer to resort to the ubiquitous trust fund theory." Perhaps partly in
consequence, if a subsequent creditor is to be allowed to set aside a repurchase
of stock, the effect of his knowledge of the transaction has not been deter-
mined. In general such knowledge appears to lessen the chances for re-
covery, but since it has always been used in connection with some other
factor of defense, its exact effect is indeterminate. In several recent decisions,
however, it has dearly been an important element in allowing a stockholder
49. Bunker M Country Club v. McElhatton, 282 Ill. App. 221 (1935); Campbll v.
Grant Trust & Savings Co., 97 Ind. App. 169, 182 N. E. 267 (1932). Often no mention
is made of the status of creditors. In re Smith Lumber Co., 132 Fed. 618 (N. D. Tex.
1904)); Moore & Co. v. Gilmore, 216 Fed. 99 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914).
50. The most stringent type of statute provides that if the capital stock shall be with-
drarm and refunded to the stockholders before the payment of all debts the stockholdera
shall be liable to "any creditor." MIcr. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 10018; First Nat. Bank
of Boyne City v. Heller Sawdust Co., 240 Mich. 688, 216 N. W. 464 (1927). But this
statute is not typical.
51. Williams v. Brownstein, I F. (2d) 470 (D. Me. 1924); Lefker v. Harner, 123
Ark. 575, 186 S. W. 75 (1916).
52. Atlanta & Walworth Butter & Cheese Ass'n v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377, 123 N. W.
106 (1909).
53. Coleman v. Tepel, 230 Fed. 63 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Alabama Terminal & Imp.
Co. v. Hall, 152 Ala. 262, 44 So. 592 (1907); Union Trust Co. v. Amery, 67 Wash 1,
120 Pac. 539 (1912) ; cf. In re Fechheimer Fishel Co., 212 Fed. 357 (C. C.A. 2d, 1914) ;
In re O'Gara & Maguire, 259 Fed. 935 (D. N. J. 1919); see First Trust Co. v. Illinois
Central R. R., 256 Fed. 830, 831 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919), cert. denied, 249 U. S. 615 (1919).
If a stockholder can show that he is innocent of the nature of the transaction, creditors
seeking to recover on the "reliance" basis might be confronted with a formidable logical
obstacle. See note 15, jupra.
54. Williams v. Brownstein, I F. (2d) 470 (D. Me. 1924); In re O'Gara & Maguire,
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to collect on a repurchase agreementY5 Even if the reliance theory is not
used, subsequent creditors with knowledge, like existing creditors, might
well be estopped from complaining. 0
The payment of dividends to stockholders where the corporation is in
difficulties is perhaps even more suspect than the repurchase of stock, since
there is generally no pretense that the corporation has received anything in
return for the dividend.57 Fraudulent conveyance concepts are even more
dominant; though in addition to the preexisting or resulting insolvency of
the corporation, 8 the guilty knowledge of the stockholder is a generally
required element in the cause of action.50 Thus the standard rule seems to
be that recovery may be had only if the creditor's claim arose before the
dividend was paid.60 And as in the case of stock repurchases a creditor may
be estopped if he had tacitly or otherwise consented to the payment of the
dividend. 6' Of course, a showing of "actual intent" to defraud will permit
subsequent creditors to recover, 2 but the practical difficulties are notoriously
great. Again sympathetic judges have sought to aid the subsequent creditor
in other ways. The category of existing creditors has been widened to include
those who extended credit before the distribution of the dividend, although
after its declaration. 63 With various doctrinal justifications, several courts
have departed completely from the rule. In one case a statute apparently
intended to apply to stock repurchase was used to allo 4 a single creditor
to recover dividends that had been paid before, as well as after the debt
55. First Trust Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 256 Fed. 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919), cert.
denied, 249 U. S. 615 (1919); Scriggins v. Dalby Co., 290 Mass. 414, 195 N. E. 749
(1935); Cross v. Beguelin, 252 N. Y. 262, 169 N. E. 378 (1929), (1930) 39 YALE L. J.
902; cf. Loveland & Co., Ltd. v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 149 Ore. 53, 39 P. (2d) 663
(1934).
56. See note 47, supra.
57. See generally, Comment (1933) 33 CoL L Rsv. 481.
58. McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1899); Quintal v. Adler, 146 Misc 300,
262 N. Y. Supp. 126 (Sup. Ct. 1933). Contra: Mente v. Groff, 10 Ohio N. P. (N. s.)
148 (C. D. 1910).
59. McDonald v. Williams, 174 U. S. 397 (1899); Bates v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 1128,
270 N. V. 867 (1937). But cf. Gratz v. Redd, 4 B. Mon. 178 (Ky. 1843).
60. Thus, receiver or trustee must show that at least one of the creditors he repre-
sents was existing at the time of the dividend payment. Wood v. National City Bank,
24 F. (2d) 661 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 542; Ratdiff v. Clendenin, 232
Fed. 61 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). But see 2 Coox, LAw OF Coa'On.TzoNS (8th ed. 1923)
§ 548. For the moment the question as to the amount of recovery possible in this situa-
tion and its distribution is immaterial, and may be postponed. See p. 1179 et :cq., infra.
61. See Lawrence v. Greenup, 97 Fed. 906, 911 (C. C. A. 6th, 1899) ; cf. Fort Mad-
ison Bank v. Alden, 129 U. S. 372 (1889).
62. See Wood v. National City Bank, 24 F. (2d) 661, 663 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928). A
court may find in the very payment of an unlawful dividend a defrauding of subsequent
as well as existing creditors. Fricke v. Angemeier, 53 Ind. App. 140, 101 N. E. 329
(1913).
63. Montgomery v. Whitehead, 40 Colo. 320, 90 Pac. 509 (1907).
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accrued. 64 Also the inevitable trust fund doctrine has been used to justify
recovery by subsequent creditors. Sometimes the trust fund and reliance
theories are found in unholy wedlock,65 but a subsequent creditor could not
safely embark on an action on the sole theory that he had relied on the
capital stock being still intact. The one court that has stated reliance alone
to be a good ground for recovery apparently could not visualize the trans-
action as a typical fraudulent conveyance and implied, perhaps unintentionally,
that existing creditors could not recover.66
This complete adherence to the theory of the watered stock cases would
be dearly indicated when a stock dividend has been used, if the corporation
were brazen enough to add the amount of the dividend to the paid-in capital
account. Probably because few corporations would adopt such a procedure,
suits have almost never been brought, but no reason appears why a subse-
quent creditor without knowledge might not be allowed to recover in that
situation.67 Since the assets would be in no way depleted, existing creditors
would probably be held in no way prejudiced.
Closely related to the payment of dividends, but occurring typically upon
the winding up of the corporation, is a type of transaction which may be
identified as "distribution of assets." As usual the rules laid down, such
as that "the distribution of a corporation's assets, leaving it incapable of
discharging its debts, is fraudulent in the eyes of the law," 68 settle almost
nothing. But the problem here can scarcely be distinguished from that in-
volved in the payment 'of unlawful dividends. The chief difference arises
from the fact that generally there will be no subsequent creditors. If there
are any such, they will probably know of the dissolution of the corporation.
Hence the position of the subsequent creditor is well nigh hopeless,60 except
in the unlikely event that the distribution was made in bad faith with knowl-
edge of the claim later to arise. Whether in consequence or not, cases display
an extraordinary stretching of the concept of the existing creditor, at least
in favor of the government. Thus the United States was allowed to recover
from stockholders where a corporation dissolved after having been indicted
64. American Steel & Wire Co. v. Eddy, 130 Mich. 266, 89 N. W. 952 (1902); see
note 50, supra.
65. Williams v. Boice, 38 N. J. Eq. 364 (Ch. 1884); Cottrell v. Albany Card &
Paper Mfg. Co., 142 App. Div. 148, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1070 (3d Dep't 1911) ; cf. Shields
v. Hobart, 172 Mo. 491, 72 S. W. 669 (1903); Rheinstrom v. Seasongood, 19 Ohio N. P.
0i. s.) 393 (Super. Ct. 1917).
66. Mackall v. Pocock, 136 Minn. 8, 161 N. W. 228 (1917).
67. Whitlock v. Alexander, 160 N. C. 465, 76 S. E. 538 (1912) ; see Anglo-American
Land Mortgage & Agency Co. v. Lombard, 132 Fed. 721, 735 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904).
68. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Hale & Kilburn Corp., 84 F. (2d) 401, 405 (C. C. A.
2d, 1936).
69. Borough of Mt. Union v. Kunz, 290 Pa. 356, 139 At. 118 (1927). But cf. Brooks
v. Buys, 217 Mich. 263, 186 N. IV. 472 (1922). An eight-judge court allowed subsequent
creditors to recover but split evenly as to whether the transaction involved was stock-
watering or distribution of assets.
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under a federal law, but before conviction and the imposition of a penalty.70
Where a retroactive tax was passed just after the dissolution of the cor-
poration, the government was deemed to have been an existing creditor
because it had held the power to levy the tax.7' But where the government
sought to collect from stockholders a tax imposed on income earned after
the transfer of assets, it was held to be a subsequent creditor and remediless.72
Thus far the inquiry has been limited to the question of recovery in situa-
tions which may be to some extent classified. When attention is focused
on the broad category usually termed preferences and fraudulent conveyances,
no sort of grouping seems to be helpful. Not only do the types of conveyance
vary, but the questions may arise in an almost unlimited number of different
proceedings. The issues are often confused by such questions as solvency
or the lack of it,73 or the fraudulent intent of the debtor transferor or even
of the transferee,74 or whether a positive showing of good faith may sustain
the transaction. 5 All these elements are reflected in the treatment of the
types of creditors, and the ad hoc nature of the decisions makes the conclu-
sions to be drawn uncertain at best. The basic rule, however, is laid down
with what seems at first sight comforting finality. In the case of Graham v.
Railroad Co.." the United States Supreme Court held that where a cor-
porate debtor disposed of property for the benefit of its officers, subsequent
creditors were helpless unless they could show an intent to defraud.
The rule stands firm today,77 but its interpretation has been far from
uniform. Sometimes, it seems to have been applied with undue severity,
70. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398 (1921).
71. United States v. Updike, 1 F. (2d) 550 (D. Neb. 1924).
72. Harwood v. Eaton, 68 F. (2d) 12 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933).
73. Oliver v. Quellmalz Lumber & Mfg. Co., 170 Ark. 1029, 282 S. V. 355 (1926);
Hamilton v. Menominee Falls Quarry Co., 106 Wis. 352, 81 N. W. 876 (1900) ; cf. Nagel
v. Farmers Exchange, 64 S. D. 363, 266 N. W. 722 (1936).
74. Irving Trust Co. v. Chase Nat. Bank of City of N. Y., 72 F. (2d) 663 (C. C. A.
2d, 1934); Lohn v. Automatic Motor Control Corp., 155 Misc. 920, 281 N. Y. Supp. 642
(Sup. Ct. 1934).
Courts tend to be more receptive to creditors' claims where a claim preferred vas that
of an officer, director, or principal stockholder [Rickerson Roller-Mill Co. i. Farrell
Foundry & Mach. Co., 75 Fed. 554 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896) ; Richards Co. v. The Mayfair,
287 Mass. 280, 191 N. E. 430 (1934)] or one on which such a person was secondarily
liable as indorser or surety. Walker Bros. v. Eastern Motors Co., 70 Utah 543, 262
Pac. 97 (1927); Ohio Finance Co. v. Mannington Window Glass Co., 86 W. Va. 322,
103 S. E. 333 (1920).
75. Wabash Ry. v. Iowa & S. W. Ry., 200 Iowa 384, 202 N. IV. 595 (1925). Thus
financial necessity may be justification for a mortgage that otherwise might be fraudu-
lent. Arizona Corporation Comm. v. California Ins. Co., 28 Ariz. 128, 236 Pac. 460
(1925); Smith v. Kornkven, 64 N. D. 789, 256 N. W. 210 (1934); Clarke oVodvward
Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 88 Ore. 284, 169 Pac. 796 (1918); cf. Handley
v. Stutz, 139 U. S. 417 (1891) (stock watering justified).
76. 102 U. S. 148 (1880).
77. City of Fort Worth v. National Park Bank of N. Y., 261 Fed. 817 (C. C. A. 5th,
1919) ; Phillips v. Carter, 266 Fed. 444 (S. D. Ga. 1920) ; Vickers v. Toerner, 176 I.
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as where the principal stockholder of a corporation drew personal checks
on it and the trustee in bankruptcy was required to allege that each creditor
was existing at the time each check was drawn28 Further, some courts
have not always been alive to the possibilities of expanding the category of
existing creditors. It is true that a creditor who has a claim normally need
not have it liquidated or reduced to judgment before the transaction occurred,
even though it be a tort claim.79 But in determining when the transfer took
effect the courts have generally adopted narrow interpretations. Thus in
the case of a fraudulent mortgage it has been held that the making of the
agreement, not the execution of the trust deed marks the time of the transfer,80
and that where the mortgage agreement covers after-acquired property the
creditor who is subsequent to the agreement is remediless.01 But on the
whole the tendency, although not as marked as in other types of cases, has
been to cut down the requirement that the claim be existing, and ingenious
subsequent creditors have on occasion been allowed to recover. For example,
where a failing corporation gave away a bill of sale to equipment but kept
the equipment, the presumption of intent to defraud subsequent creditors was
held to overcome general evidence of good faith.82 An analogy to the apparent
ownership cases is dear. The Missouri court has used reliance-that the
paid-up capital has remained intact-to eliminate the necessity of a trustee
in bankruptcy alleging anything as to the status of the creditors represented
by him,m but has been inconsistent as to whether there is a presumption of
reliance." In a recent Colorado case a complaint of a trustee which did not
allege the previous existence of any creditors was sustained over a two-
judge dissent based on the Graham case.85 The defendants, who were the
former owners of a small corporation overburdened by indebtedness, had
471, 146 So. 26 (1933) ; Commercial Trust Co. v. Wertheim Coal & Coke Co., 88 N. J.
Eq. 143, 102 Adt. 448 (Ch. 1917).
78. Scales v. Holje, 41 (a1. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919). Normally proof of one
existing creditor is enough. Cf. note 60, supra. See p. 1179, infra.
79. Valley Bank v. Malcolm, 23 Ariz. 395, 204 Pac. 207 (1922); cf. Hastings v.
Drew, 76 N. Y. 9 (1879).
80. Dowdle v. Central Brick Co., 206 Ind. 242, 189 N. E. 145 (1934).
81. Clarke Woodward Drug Co. v. Hot Lake Sanatorium Co., 88 Ore. 284, 169 Pac.
796 (1918). Of course this will not be true where the court is inclined to view after-
acquired property clauses as invalid as against subsequent creditors. See WALSlU, M0rT-
GAGES (1934) § 10, 11; cf. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U. S. 353 (1925) (future book ac-
counts assigned); Zartman v. First Nat. Bank of Waterloo, 189 N. Y. 267, 82 N. E.
127 (1907). In the latter case, where the clause covered shifting stock but allowed the
mortgagor the disposition and use of it until default, creditors were presumed to have
relied on apparent ownership, though the mortgage provisions were recorded. See id, it
271, 82 N. E. at 128.
82. Sarasota County v. Weeks, 100 Fla. 1064, 130 So. 599 (1930).
83. Coleman v. Booth, 268 Mo. 64, 186 S. "W. 1021 (1916).
84. Compare Coleman v. Hagey, 252 Mo. 102, 158 S. W. 829 (1913), with Coleman
v. Booth, 268 Mo. 64, 186 S. IV. 1021 (1916).
85. Bowman v. Melnick, 99 Colo. 311, 63 P. (2d) 464 (1936).
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sold the business and taken notes and mortgages of the company to secure
payment. Although the mortgages were of record, subsequent creditors had
no notice that the corporation had received no new capital from the added
debt and the transaction was held fraudulent as to them. Like cases"o seem
to promise success for subsequent creditors wherever a fraudulent transfer
is made in the form of a mortgage, which though recorded does not bear on
its face a statement of its purpose. This situation can be analogized to that
in the watered stock cases, since in both creditors may recover at the expense
of security holders who have not paid full value to the corporation. Such
analogies may be useful in argument, but where a fraudulent transfer is con-
sidered sufficiently flagrant, subsequent creditors will probably be allowed
to set it aside and doctrinal explanations are superfluous, whether they follow
the line that fraudulent intent will be presumed,87 or that the transfer was
made with the knowledge that subsequent creditors might assume the cor-
porate assets not to have been so dissipated.m
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act has made no great change in
this respect.8 9 Section 7 requires "actual intent, as distinguished from intent
presumed in law," to defraud future creditors before they may have a remedy.
But Sections 5 and 6 provide that conveyances may be fraudulent as to
subsequent creditors when made in the course of a business "for which the
property remaining . . . is an unreasonably small capital, without regard
to intent," or when the transferor "intends or believes that he will incur
debts beyond his ability to pay." Conceivably under either of these sections,
especially the former, subsequent creditors could attack any conveyance made
by a corporation, already insolvent or thereby becoming so. But in the sixteen
states where the Act has been enacted the cases indicate no increased tendency
in this direction."0 It may be that proof of reliance will not be required under
86. In re Haas Co., 131 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904); ef. Johnson v. Canfild-Swi-
gart Co., 292 Ill. 101, 126 N. E. 608 (1920); Clark v. E. C. Clark Machine Co., 151 Mich.
416, 115 N. NV. 416 (1903). On similar facts it has been held that recorded bills of sale
by the former owners put the public on notice as to the nature of the mortgage. Shumpert
v. National State Bank of Columbia, 231 Fed. 82 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916).
87. E.g., Sarasota County v. Weeks, 100 Fla. 1064, 130 So. 599 (1930). See Com-
ment (1924) 37 HARv. L. Rrv. 489, treating conveyances in fraud of subsequent creditors
in general.
88. United States Rubber Co. v. American Oak Leather Co., 96 Fed. 891 (C. C. A.
7th, 1899); In re Haas Co., 131 Fed. 232 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904); Coleman v. Booth,
268 Mo. 64, 186 S. W. 1021 (1916).
89. See, generally, McLaughlin, Application of the Uniformn Fraudulent Conveyance
Act (1933) 46 HAnv. L. Rrv. 404.
90. Little use has been made of §§ 5 and 6. See 9 Uxronpt LAws AmcorAwr (1932)
177, (Supp. 1937) 108. But see McBride v. Bertcch, 58 F. (2d) 797 (W. D. Mich. 1930).
Even where it is in force, the Uniform Act often passes unmentioned in the fraudulent
conveyances cases-though subsequent creditors be favored [Hemphill Co. v. Davis--nit-
ting Co., 114 Pa. Super. 94, 173 AtI. 704 (1934); cf. Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233,
167 N. E. 314 (1929)] or disfavored. Memphis Lumber Co. v. Security Bank & Trust
Co., 143 Tenn. 136, 226 S. NV. 182 (1920). But see In re Haber's Estate, 151 Misc. 82, 84,
270 N. Y. Supp. 603, 606 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
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the Act, for neither of these sections makes provision for an application of
the reliance theory. Thus if a right of recovery is recognized in any sub-
sequent creditors, it will probably be recognized in all.
Whether the distinctions between creditors that have just been traced are
justified is a question to which there is no ready answer; the validity of
discriminating-like the type of discrimination-will vary in each situation.
Since stock watering, failing to record a mortgage, or other false appearances
of ownership can only injure relying creditors, it is plausible-at least in
theory-to limit recovery to such creditors alone. But this survey has shown
that courts and legislatures, recognizing the impracticability of proving reli-
ance, have allowed creditors who conceivably could have relied to recover
in all of these situations. Actually very few of the creditors who fall into
this category are likely to rely. In a good many cases the creditor will not
be aware of the "false representation," for even cursory investigation of the
debtor's position is the exception rather than the norm. Certainly in watered
stock cases the possibility that the creditor examined the debtor's balance
sheet is fairly remote. And even an insight into the true state of the debtor's
affairs will not necessarily dissuade the creditor from extending credit."
There may be a somewhat greater likelihood of reliance in the unrecorded
mortgage cases, for these cases are likely to involve small merchants whose
visible possessions may have some effect on their credit standing.92 But at
least in the watered stock cases, distinctions between creditors are of dubious
validity, for few of the favored creditors are prone to extend credit in reliance
on the false representations.
In" the fraudulent conveyance field, it is said that recovery is granted to
existing creditors because assets which they had a right to look to for satis-
faction were wrongfully dissipated; recovery is denied to subsequent creditors,
because they extended credit to an already denuded debtor. Unlike the
"reliance" cases, here the pjractical administration of recovery corresponds
to theory, but the theoretical basis of recovery is of questionable adequacy.
For if no fraudulent conveyance were made, the property or its equivalent
would be available to subsequent as well as to existing creditors. Further-
more, there is as much justification for the application of the reliance theory
in this field as in the apparent ownership cases. Creditors who knew of
fraudulent conveyances would be fully as reluctant to extend credit as those
who knew that an appearance of affluence was misleading. Especially in the
case of stock repurchases and unlawful dividend payments, creditors are as
likely to rely on the debtor's financial resources as they are in the case of
watered stock. And abolition of the discrimination between creditors would
91. See note 25, supra; Comment (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1177, 1207.
92. Since recordation does not in fact supply knowledce, creditors whose claims arose
after delayed recordation may actually have relied on apparent ownership, and yet be
denied recovery. This may seem to be an inconsistent result, but it is one which can
not be avoided without a complete reversal of the policy back of the recording acts.
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have an added virtue: it would minimize the administrative inconvenience
now entailed by the necessity for proof of existence or subsequence.03
Though there may not appear to be substantial grounds for preferring
one group of creditors to another, it does not necessarily follow that the
distinctions should be abolished. For if no distinction were made, recovery
would either have to be denied or granted to all creditors. The first alterna-
tive seems dearly undesirable; indisputably creditors have been injured when
property is fraudulently conveyed; and since false appearances of ownership
will result in injury on some occasions, some sanctions at least are necessary
in such cases. On the other hand, it is by no means dear that complete
recovery is always justified. It is true that in the case of the typical fraudu-
lent conveyance little sympathy need be wasted on the transferee; he is
deprived only of an undeserved gain. But in other situations full recovery
may impose an unwarranted penalty on the victim of the creditors' claims.
In the watered stock cases, for example, the stockholders have actually not
received any of the corporate assets, and great hardship may be entailed.
While it may be justifiable to allow complete recovery against a promoter-
stockholder, it is decidedly less equitable to impose such a penalty on a
small investor who unsuspectingly received a bonus of common stock with
his purchase of preferred. Similarly, the granting of indiscriminate recovery
in the unrecorded mortgage field imposes a penalty far greater than the
damage that could possibly have been inflicted by the omissions of the mort-
gagee. Distinctions between creditors on a basis of possible injury, then,
serve the purpose of preventing undue castigation of mortgagees and watered
stockholders. But there appears no reason why in the fraudulent conveyance
field at least, recovery should not be allowed to all creditors.04 And as has
been shown courts who wish to reach this result have satisfactory devices
readily available.
Since claims unavailable to the debtor are asserted by creditors only when
other expedients prove unsatisfactory, they will often not be made until the
debtor's estate is under the administration of a bankruptcy or receivership
court. While generally the trustee or receiver may sue in the right of the
most favorably situated creditors,05 much the same problems found in the
93. It may often happen that a creditor has been extending credit over a period of
time. In a watered stock case, for example, he may thus be under a heavy burden to
prove that the debts remaining unpaid arose after the stock transaction and before he
acquired knowledge of it Rickerson Roller-Mill Co. v. Farrell Foundry & Mach. Co.,
75 Fed. 554 (C. C.A. 6th, 1896).
94. Although the distinctions between existing and subsequent creditors were aban-
doned, knowledge of or participation in a fraudulent transfer might still be held to bar a
creditor from recovery without inconsistency. Cf. notes 47, 61, suitra. The doctrine of
"clean hands" need lose none of its force.
95. See, generally, Comments (1936) 45 YALE L J. 504, (1935) 33 MIciH. L Rxv.
1059, 1067; (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 1229; cf. (1933) 38 COL. L. REV. 523. No attempt has
been made in this Comment to consider the special problems arising under assignments
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analysis of individual actions are raised in slightly different form by two
issues: the amount of recovery to be allowed and the method of its distri-
bution. Where an individual creditor is suing, it is clear that recovery will
be had only to the extent of his claim and for his benefit alone. 9 The same
rationales which lead to this result, if applied in receivership or bankruptcy,
point to recovery only to the extent of the claims of creditors, who would
themselves have been in a position to recover, and distribution of the property
exclusively to them. Insofar as recovery is allowed to a greater extent or
distribution is made to others as well, it is apparent that the theories vesting
certain creditors with rights to the exclusion of others are no longer con-
trolling.
Whether or not these theories should be allowed to control in bankruptcy
or receivership is a question which depends on the same considerations
raised in the foregoing discussion of the validity of the distinctions made
between creditors and the protection to be accorded the victim of their claims.
The conclusion there reached was that in general such protection might
necessitate the retention of distinctions otherwise valueless. In bankruptcy
or receivership, however, unlike individual actions, it is possible to treat
the two problems separately. For the arbitrary discrimination between credi-
tors can be eliminated by allowing ratable distribution of the property re-
covered to all. At the same time the "victim" can be protected by limiting the
amount of recovery. A decision in favor of equal distribution, which is
probably always desirable, even if only for its simplicity and ease of admin-
istration, is thus not subject to criticism on the ground that it necessarily
entails unlimited recovery.9 7 Unquestionably, the devotee of consistency will
object that so long as the distinctions are made when individual creditors
are suing, there can be no reason for their abandonment in receivership or
bankruptcy. 98 Just as secured creditors are not robbed of their priority under
for t.e benefit of creditors. For the power of the assignee to sue, see Comments (1938)
47 YALE L. J. 944, 956, (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 504, 509.
96. Even if a creditor's action be in behalf of all those similarly situated who may
wish to join, distribution can not go beyond the members of that class, E.g., Braun v.
American Laundry Mach. Co., 56 F. (2d) 197 (S. D. N. Y. 1932). Presumably a uc-
cessful action -by any one creditor would give imperative force to the claim of any Simi-
larly situated creditor, at least for purpose of settlement.
97. Some commentators seem to have assumed the contrary. See note 130, infra. If
distribution is to be only to favored creditors, however, it follows of necessity that re-
covery will be limited to the claims of that class. On the other hand, a prior determina-
tion of the amount of recovery forecloses no possibilities as to methods of distribution.
If recovery is to be limited, a wide variety of methods is available. See appended table,
p. 1192, infra. If recovery is not to be so limited, it is probable that equal distribution
to all creditors will follow, but it has been argued that in such case the favored creditors
should first'be satisfied in full and that otily the balance of the property recovered should
go to the remaining creditors. See In re Le% is Co., 62 F. (2d) 353. 354 (C. C. A. Sil,
1932).
98. Analogy may be drawn from the piopo.sition that proivrty which is non-excmlpt
only as to certain creditors dor5 not pass to the estate iii bankruptcy for the benefit of aIl
creditors. In re Neumaier, 11 F. Supp. 341 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
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judicial administration,99 it may be said, so creditors with an added source
for the satisfaction of their claims should not be denied their advantage. But
there can be no reason for adhering to a rule when, as has been shown, the
reasons for following that rule have disappeared. Whatever the merits of
these opposing arguments, courts have chosen to dispose of these problems
without reference to broad policy justifications, but almost solely on the
basis of general theories as to the status of representatives of creditors.
As early as 1873 the United States Supreme Court said, "It is well settled,
where a deed is set aside as void as to existing creditors, that all the creditors,
prior and subsequent, share in the fund pro rata."' 100 This rule seems to have
been accepted by the bankruptcy courts without much question in the fraud-
ulent conveyance field,"1 ' especially since the case of Globe Bank and Trust
Co. v. Martin.uY 2 It is true that an occasional dissenting voice10 3 seeks to
distinguish away this case on the ground that equal distribution there resulted
only because existing creditors had obtained a lien within four months of
the bankruptcy ;10 for under Section 67(f) of the Bankruptcy Act a lien
obtained within four months, if preserved by the trustee, operates for the
benefit of the whole estate. 10 5 But, rightly or wrongly, the Globe Bank case
has been repeatedly cited as authority for the broader proposition that under
Section 70(a) and (e) the trustee may set aside for the benefit of the whole
estate any transfer made in fraud of any creditors. 00
99. It is to be noted that if a favored creditor obtains a valid lien on fraudulently
transferred or apparently owned property before the four months period, this lien will
entitle him to priority in bankruptcy and there will be no question of equal distribution.
Bankruptcy Act § 67(d); cf. Metcalf v. Barker, 187 U. S. 165 (1902). On the other
hand, if such a lien is obtained within four months, it is voidable and inures to the benefit
of the whole estate. See note 105, infra. Thus, the issue of equal ilistribution t'el nons
can arise only if there was no lien of any kind on the property.
100. See Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. 31, 36 (U. S. 1873); Oliver v. Brennan, 292 Fed.
197, 201 (N. D. Cal. 1923), aff'd, 299 Fed. 106 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
101. In re Moore, 11 F. (2d) 62 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Campbell v. Dalbty, 23 F.
(2d) 229 (C. C. A. 5th, 1977); Cohen v. Schultz, 43 F. (2d) 340 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930);
In re L. H. Lewis Co., 62 F. (2d) 353 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932). The last case cited sought
to distinguish American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, 254 Fed. 780 (1918). note
103, infra, which arose in the same Circuit Court of Appeals, but in effect overruled it.
102. 236 U. S. 288 (1915).
103. American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, 254 Fed. 780 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918);
Dodd v. Raines, 1 F. (2d) 658 (N. D. Ga. 1924) (bulk sale); Costello v. Emmick, 122
Misc. 114;203 N. Y. Supp. 123 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
104. See American Trust & Savings Bank v. Duncan, 254 Fed. 790, 783 (C. C. A. .th,
1918).
105. First National Bank of Baltimore v. Staake, 202 U. S. 141 (1906).
106. See cases cited note 101, supra. For an explicit interpretation of the case as
holding to this effect, see In re Mt!oore, 11 F. (2d) 62, 64 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926). It is note-
worthy that whenever property is said to be distributed "to all creditors" or "for the
benefit of the estate," it will necessarily be subject to any priorities existing in the gen-
eral assets. Thus, it is not inconceivable that those creditors who were favorably situated
as to a fraudulent transfer might receive nothing from the property recovered. Cf. NVat-
kins v. Seaberry, 261 U. S. 571 (1923).
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Much more uncertain, however, is the question as to the extent of thi"
trustee's recovery. 0 7 Since under Section 67(e) he may set aside fraud-
ulent conveyances made within the four months period in his own statutory
right,1 08 it is probable that he may void such transfers completely.'0 D But
under Section 70(e) he may attack other fraudulent conveyances only in
the right of creditors who might have done so."" Even though Section 70(a)
is repeatedly said to give the trustee title to the fraudulently transferred
property, 11 it may be argued that he is vested with title only to the extent
that the property was fraudulently transferred, that is, to the extent of the
claims of existing creditors. On the other hand, simply because it is ad-
mitted that the trustee is in no better legal position than the creditors whom
he represents, 112 it may not be accurate to say that he is merely subrogated
to their rights." 3 The precedent on both sides is unsatisfactory.1 14 Most
of the cases seeming at first to favor the total setting aside of fraudulent
transfers are revealed on closer inspection to be based on the belief that the
transfers were intentionally fraudulent to subsequent and existing creditors.116
And cases which hold that there can be no recovery where there was no
favorably situated creditor,1 6 or that the recovery will be distributed only
to the favored creditors,"' while they preclude the application of the un-
limited recovery rule, are not authority against it. The rare cases directly
in point seem to favor recovery in toto."18 Irrespective of the intricacies of
107. For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed throughout the following discussion
that complete recovery is needed in order to satisfy all creditors.
108. See Frost v. Latham, 181 Fed. 866, 870 (C. C. Ala. 1910) ; In re Gray, 47 App.
Div. 554, 557, 62 N. Y. Supp. 618, 620 (1st Dep't, 1900).
109. But cases, surprisingly enough, are lacking. This may be due to the fact that the
proposition has been taken for granted. On the other hand, it may be that, since creditors
would rarely be subsequent to such conveyances and the latter would be void in any case
as against all existing creditors, the problem has not arisen.
110. See 4 RmrxNatOx, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1935) 319.
111. See Globe Bank v. Martin, 236 U. S. 288, 296 (1915); In re Kohler, 159 Fed.
871, 873 (C. C. A, 6th, 1908) ;'Cohen v. Schultz, 43 F. (2d) 340, 342 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930).
112. Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919).
113. See In re Gray, 47 App. Div. 554, 557, 62 N. Y. Supp. 618, 620 (1st Dep't, 1900),
quoted in Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 735, 183 Pac. 308, 309 (1919).
114. One source of confusion has been those cases where a fraudulent transfer is set
aside in toto pending the determination of existing creditors' claims and in contemplation
of a return of the surplus to the transferee. Cunningham v. Mitchell, 126 Wash. 294,
218 Pac. 386 (1923) ; McCrory v. Donald, 119 Miss. 256. 80 So. 643 (1919).
115. Davis v. Gates, 235 Fed. 192 (M. D. Pa. 1916) ; Goetz v. Newell, 183 Wis. 559,
198 N. W. 368 (1924). Where this is the case, there will be no question but that all
creditors will share ratably in the proceeds, not excluding the transferee if he have a bona
fide claim. Buffum v. Barceloux Co., 289 U. S. 227 (1933) : In re Kohler, 159 Fed, 871
(C. C. A. 6th, 1908) (suit settled).
116. Scales v. Holje, 41 Cal. App. 733, 183 Pac. 308 (1919).
117. Dodd v. Raines, I F. (2d) 658 (N. D. Ga. 1924).
118. Watkins v. Sedberry, 261 U. S. 571 (1923); In re Lewis Co., 62 F. (2d) 353
(C. C. A. 5th, 1932). But cf. Bergin v. Blackwood, 141 Minn. 325, 170 N. W. 508 (1919)
(transfer in fraud of estoppel creditors). See, also, note 132, infra.
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statutory interpretation these decisions seem justifiable on broader grounds
of policy, for the claims of innocent creditors in the conveyed property should
be held superior to those of fraudulent transferees, at least where the latter
acted in collusion with the transferor.110 Whatever rules are adopted for the
typical fraudulent conveyance, it may be surmised, though cases are rare,
that the same will be applied to the stock repurchase and unlawful dividend
situations.120
In the unrecorded mortgage field, there has been considerably more con-
fusion. It seems, however, that where the mortgage or conditional sale is
never recorded, or not recorded until after the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, all creditors, including those whose claims arose before the mortgage
or sale agreements, will share ratably.12' This result is said to follow from
the Amendment of 1910 to Section 47(a) providing that the trustee has all
the rights of a lien creditor as of the time the petition was filed;lm since
such a creditor could set the mortgage aside, the trustee sues in his own
right,12 and hence for the benefit of the whole estate. But this rationalization
is of questionable soundness. In part at least the trustee's right is derived
from creditors; for state statutes generally provide that notice of the real
ownership destroys the claim even of a lien creditor,124 and the view that
Section 67(a) makes the trustee a lien creditor without notice is in the
minority.1  The generally prevailing rule is rather that he must represent
at least one creditor without notice.'!( But even though the trustee derives
It is to be noted that here, as elsewhere, the state statutes, which determine the trus-
tee's cause of action, may cause variation in the absolute amount of recovery possible.
119. There are at least three types of fraudulent transferees, those who were in col-
lusion with the transferor, those who drove a hard bargain with him and are later held
not to have given consideration, and those who received preferences within the four-
month period. Obviously the latter two may be deserving of some consideration, even as
against innocent creditors. But when "fraudulent transferee" is used in this comment, it is
intended to refer to the first type only unless the context indicates otherwise.
120. Lytle v. Andrews, 34 F. (2d) 252 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
121. Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914); In re
Frost, 12 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) ; In re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 6W7 (D. Md. 1928) ;
In re Myers Motor Sales Co., 1 F. Supp. 509 (S. D. Tex. 1932). But cf. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Gross, 17 F. (2d) 417 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927).
122. 36 STAT. 840 (1910), 11 U. S. C. §75(a) (1934) ; In re Farmers' Cooperative Co.
of Barlow, 202 Fed. 1008 (D. N. D. 1913); In re Rosenthal, 2-3 Fed. 597 (S. D. Ga.
1916), distinguishing Simmons v. Greer, 174 Fed. 654 (C. C. A. 4th, 1909).
123. See In re Farmers' Cooperative Co. of Barlow, 202 Fed. 1003, 1009 (D. N. D.
1913).
124. See. e.g., CArL Civ. Cooe (Deering, 1937) §2973; N. Y. Pr.sozA. Pnorznrr
LAw §65.
125. E.g., Townsend v. Ashepoo Fertilizer Co., 212 Fed. 97 (C. C. A. 4th, 1914).
125. Usually the trustee has the burden of proving this fact. National Bond & Inv.
Co. v. Jones, 78 F. (2d) 601 (C. C. A. 6th, 1935) ; In re Douglas Lumber Co., 2 F. (2d)
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from individual creditors his status as a creditor without notice, it is now
clearly settled that when a mortgage has not been recorded at the time of
the filing of the petition the trustee may recover for the benefit of the whole
estate. 12 And the cases seem to intimate that he will also be allowed un-
limited recovery.
The chiei difficulty in the past has been in the situation where the mort-
gage was recorded before the filing of the petition. Since the trustee is in
the position of a creditor whose rights accrue only at the time the petition
was filed, he can only recover in the rights of creditors who extended credit
before recordation.128  But the conflict as to the method of distribution in
this situation seems to have been finally settled in the case of Moore v. Bay,
12
wherein the Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Holmes, said that "The
rights of the trustee by subrogation are to be enforced for the benefit of the
estate." It has been sometimes assumed that the same case necessarily laid
down the rule that an unrecorded mortgage might be set aside completely,
even if it exceeded in amount the claims of the favorably situated creditors.'"
Since there is no indication in the record of the case that this situation existed,
certain equivocal phrases in the opinion are the only apparent evidence to
support this assumption."" But other language in the case submits to an
opposite construction. Indeed an argument might be drawn from the sentence
quoted above, for rights by subrogation can scarcely exceed their origins.
At the very least it seems clear that this issue remains in doubt in the un-
recorded mortgage field;1 2 and it is at best of doubtful wisdom to inflict
935 (D. Wyo. 1924); cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Raz Delivery, 238 App.
Div. 277, 264 N. Y. Supp. 412 (4th Dep't, 1933). But some cases require the mortgagee
to prove that all creditors had notice. In re Master Knitting Corp., 7 F. (2d) 11 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1925). But see dissenting opinion of Learned Hand, J. Here again variations may
be due to peculiarities of local law as to the effect of notice, etc.
127. See notes 121, 122, supra.
128. In re New York Economical Printing Co., 110 Fed. 514 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901);
In re Myers, 24 F. (2d) 349 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) (only debtor's equity in the mortgaged
property distributed for benefif of whole estate).
129. 284 U. S. 4 (1931), (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 629. It does not necessarily follow
that this rule will be applied in the "estoppel creditor" cases [see notes 10-12, .supral,
where the court seems to consider the creditor's claim of a more personal nature. Hart
v. Casterton, 56 N. D. 581, 218 N. W. 644 (1928) ; cf. Bergin v. Blackwood, 141 Minn.
325, 170 N. W. 508 (1919).
130. See Scott, Recordation Provisions in Bankruptcy Act (1931) 18 VA. L. REv.
249, 265, 268; (1932) 45 HAMy. L. Rxv. 579. But see (1932) 41 YALu L. J. 629.
131. "The question raised is whether the mortgage is void also as against those who
gave the bankrupt credit at a later date, after the mortgage was on record." See Moore
v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4, 5 (1931). However, an analysis of the mandate handed down by the
court in the light of the record of the case may lead to a conclusion that this question
was answered in the negative, contrary to superficial appearances. See Buffum v, Mary-
land Casualty Co., 88 F. (2d) 547, 548 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
132. In a recent case Moore v. Bay was cited to support a holding that a fraudulent
$1200 mortgage should be set aside in toto, though existing creditors' claims were only
$55.91. It was not clear, however, that only existing creditors were in a position to
set it aside. In re Doderick, 91 F. (2d) 646 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937).
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a penalty on the mortgagee out of all proportion to the injury possibly oc-
casioned by failure to record.
Even greater uncertainty surrounds thie treatment of these problems in
the receivership courts. In general it has been suggested that the rules of
distribution in receivership should follow those laid down for bankruptcy,13
and probably at least in a fraudulent conveyance case the receiver should
distribute the proceeds to all creditors. 34 A fair guess can be made that the
same result has been reached in recordation cases denying the mortgagee's
or conditional vendor's claim for priority,135 but at least one receivership
court has specifically followed a procedure other than that of equal distri-
bution in this field.136 As to amount of recovery there is no positive indication
that it has ever been allowed to exceed the favored creditors' claims.
In the watered stock cases, the issue of equal distribution vel non is affected
and confused by the uncertainty as to whether a trustee or a receiver can
sue at all on such claims. Although most courts probably allow such actions," 7
others have said that if the creditors' claim against the stockholder is based on
fraud and deceit, that is, on the reliance theory, it cannot be maintained by
a trustee;a88 still others, that where the right exists only in some creditors
and not in all, a receiver is helpless.' 30 At least partially because of this
difficulty,140 receivers or trustees may often attempt to frame the cause of
action in terms of unpaid subscriptions. If the action is so framed, there will
be no favored creditors, and the trustee's or receiver's recovery 'will be for
the benefit of all.141 Where suit is allowed on a watered stock theory, the
133. Levin Co. v. Star Jewelry Co., 54 1. 1. 465, 175 At. 651 (1934).
134. Washington Mill Co. v. Sprague Lumber Co., 19 Vash. 165, 52 Pac. 1067 (1893).
But see Bram v. American Laundry Mach. Co., 56 F. (2d) 197, 200 (S. D. N. Y. 1932).
135. Cornelius v. C. C. Pictures, 297 Fed. 444 (C. C A. 2d, 1924); SalOlzan &
Co. v. Voorhees, 292 Fed. 113 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923) ; Wood v. Cox, 92 N. J. Eq. 307, 113
Atl. 501 (Ch. 1921); National Bread Wrapping Mach. Co. v. Crowl, 137 Wash. 621,
243 Pac. 840 (1926).
136. See notes 162, 163, infra.
137. Trustee: In re Phoenix Hardware Co., 249 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) ; Grand
Rapids Trust Co. v. Nichols, 199 Mich. 126, 165 N. V. 667 (1917); Compton v. Per-
kins, 144 Ore. 346, 24 P. (2d) 670 (1933). Receiver: Lex v. Selay Steel Corp., 203
Iowa 792, 206 N. W. 586 (1925) ; Berry v. Rood, 168 Mdo. 316, 67 S. IV. 644 (1902);
Wolcott v. Waldstein, 86 N. J. Eq. 63, 97 Atl. 951 (Ch. 1916).
138. Courtney v. Georger, 228 Fed. 859 (C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Courtney v. Croxton,
239 Fed. 247 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917); Thomason v. Miller, 4 S. IV. (2d) 66 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1928); cf. In re Huffman-Salvar Roofing Paint Co., 234 Fed. 793 (N. D. Ala.
1916).
139. Marion Trust Co. v. Blish, 170 Ind. 686, 84 N. F. 814 (1903) ; see Hlrchfeld v.
McKinley, 78 F. (2d) 124, 135 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) (trustee); cf. Farnsworth v. Wood,
91 N.Y. 307 (1883). See, in general, (1937) 46 YA=.n L. J. 1229.
140. Another reason may be the desire to frame the action in favor of existing cred-.
itors, as well as sdubequ t. Cf. p. 1169, £ujpra.
141. Livingston v. Adams, 226 Mo. App. 824, 43 S. NV. (2d) 836 (1931) ; Palmer v.
Scheftel, 194 App. Div. 682, 186 N. Y. Supp. 84 (1st Dep't 1921); cf. Scovill v. Thayer,
105 U. S. 143 (1881). There is no question but that a trustee or receiver can recover
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result as to distribution cannot be so easily predicted. The few cases that
have explicitly dealt with the issue are inconsistent.142 Most significant is a
Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding the action of a trustee in bank-
ruptcy in compromising a watered stock claim and dividing it ratably among
all creditors, over the protest of certain creditors whose right against the
stockholders might have entitled them to 100% recovery. 148 The court, noting
the trustee's dilemma, suggested that assets recovered by him in the right
of favorably situated creditors might have been distributed to all and cited
the Globe Bank case as analogous. Since Moore v. Bay, decided subsequently,
would be much stronger authority for such a proposition, like results are
perhaps the more to be expected in the future. Again in this field, there has
been no definitive determination on the issue of amount of recovery. 144
Though fairly well established in the bankruptcy field, the equal distribution
rule is not universally applied in the receivership courts. Where the recovery
is to inure to the benefit of the favored creditors, a whole new set of prob-
lems and alternatives arise with respect to the method of distributing assets.
But little help as to the appropriate method of distribution can be obtained
from the reported cases, for with one or two exceptions the courts have suc-
cessfully avoided the issues. One explanation for the dearth of definitive
decisions may be that the tendency is to settle the difficulties by negotiation in
the receivership or bankruptcy court itself. Another plausible solution is that
the rule of equal distribution, which avoids the problem, is more universal
than the decided cases Would indicate. In any case the almost complete
absence of authority leaves the field open for the suggestion of possibilities.
For purposes of clarity in exposition it seems essential to assume a hypo-
thetical case. Since the use of a single set of figures may convey a misleading
impression, in the appended table on page 1192, infra, various rules of distri-
bution are applied to three situations, which vary, not as to the claims, but
as to the amount of property available. In the discussion which follows in
the text, however, reference will be made only to the first, situation A.
It is supposed that a corporation has debts of $3000, $1000 of which is
secured by a mortgage on property worth $1000. The remaining assets avail-
able for distribution amount to $1000. The mortgage, however, is invalid as
against a group of "subsequent creditors" with claims of $1000, because of
delay in recordation. It is valid as against "existing creditors," who also have
unpaid subscriptions. Allen v. Ryan, 219 App. Div. 634, 221 N. Y. Supp. 77 (4th Dep't
1927) ; see Gilmer v. Wilcox, 194 Wis. 107, 109, 215 N. W. 827, 828 (1927).
142. Compare Jones Co. v. Home Oil & Development Co., 124 La. 148, 49 So. 1009
(1909) (equal distribution), with Berry v. Rood, 168 Mo. 316, 67 S. W. 644 (1902).
143. Petition of Stuart, 272 Fed. 938 (C. C. A. 6th. 1921).
144. While the distribution issue is ever present when there are differently situated
creditors, the extent of recovery may often be a purely academic question, for it arise ill
fact only where the possible recovery exceeds the claims of favorably situated creditors.
That this is an unlikely eventuality is perhaps indicated by the paucity of decisions oil
the point.
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claims of $1000. The mortgagee's claim is undisputed, so that at worbt lie
ranks as an unsecured creditor.
The basis for the first group of methods to be considered is the premie that
the subsequent creditors are to have a preferred claim on the mortgaged
property to the exclusion not only of the existing creditors, but of the mort-
gagee as well. The problems arise solely as to the distribution of the general
assets. Proceeding upon the classical principle of marshalling assets--that
a creditor with two sources for the satisfaction of his claim must first have
recourse to that which is available to him only' 4 5 -in methods (a) and (b)
of type I the subsequent creditors first collect the mortgaged property and
then if necessary prove in the general estate.140 The issue remains as to
whether they may still prove their total original claims and share pro rata
on that basis, a procedure known as the "equity rule";147 or whether they
may only prove as to the balance unpaid on their claims, according to the
"bankruptcy rule.' 148 The consequence of the latter is obviously to reduce
their return in favor of both the other groups.1 40 The former is in accordance
with the strict rule that the doubly secured creditor must not be prejudiced
by the application of the doctrine of marshalling.150
By forcing the subsequent creditors to exhaust their remedies against the
mortgaged property before allowing them to prove in the general estate, the
rule of marshalling favors the existing creditors at the expense of the mort-
gagee. An alternative method would be to compel the favored creditors,
along with the disfavored creditors and the mortgagee, to seek first their
pro rata share in the general estate. Then the mortgaged property would
go to the subsequent creditors to the extent necessary to satisfy their claims,
145. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Proctor, 40 F. (2d) 841, 843 (C. C.
A. 1st, 1930).
146. This was the rule applied in In re Cannon, 121 Fed. 582 (D. S. C. 1903), a bank-
ruptcy case before the Amendment of 1910. See note 122, £u pro. Since the fund in dis-
pute arose solely from the property mortgaged, only the first step in the method is indi-
cated. The various results in this type of situation are shown in situation C of the
appended table.
147. Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U. S. 131 (1899). White, Harlan, McKenna, JJ.,
dissenting, favored the "bankruptcy rule."
148. Old First Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Scheuman, 13 N. . (2d) 551 (Ind. 1938).
For a collection of cases supporting these and two other less important rules, see Note
L. R. A. 1918 B 1021. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 57(e) and (h) ; In re Mayer, 41 F. (2d)
856 (D. Pa. 1930).
149. Under situation A in the appended table, according to the type I rules, there is
no need for the subsequent creditors to prove in the general assets; therefore there is no
difference between I(a) and 1(b). Situation B in the table has been laid out for the
purpose of showing the different results that may attend the application of the "equity
rule" or the "bankruptcy rule.'
150. See.People v. Remington & Sons. 121 N. Y. 328, 333, 24 N. . 793, 794 (1890);
cf. Woman's Hospital v. Sixty-Seventh SL Realty Co., 265 N. Y. 226, 234, 192 N. E.
302, 306 (1934).
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the mortgagee retaining any balance.";' Since under this method the subse-
quent creditors must make primary resort to the estate, the chances that
there will be a surplus left in the mortgaged property for the mortgagee are
enhanced; he is thereby benefited at the expense of the existing creditors.52
It may also be noted that this method, I(c), like the "equity rule" of mar-
shalling, gives the preferred group the greatest possible advantage over the
others, 53 for it allows full proof of the favored creditors' claims in the general
estate.
.There seems, however, to be no commanding reason for the assumption
thus far made that the preferred creditors should receive the benefit of all
the mortgaged property. It may be urged that though not itself fraudulent,
an unrecorded mortgage violates a statute intended to prevent fraud, and
that strong penalties are needed for enforcement. 1'5  But the danger that the
mortgage may be invalidated even as to a limited group of creditors is
certainly a severe enough sanction. Exclusive distribution to subsequent
creditors, then, can be supported only if it is assumed that the subsequent
creditor might not have extended credit at all had he known of the mortgage;
but this premise is at best of doubtful validity.
It is equally reasonable to place the subsequent creditors in the position
they would have been in, had the mortgaged property been in fact unen-
cumbered. To accomplish this, it is sufficient to deprive the mortgagee of
his security; there is no reason to penalize him further by relegating him
to a position behind the subsequent creditors, for, unlike a fraudulent trans-
feree, he has a bona fide unsecured claim. A possible basis of distribution
then would be a ratable sharing of the mortgaged property between the
mortgagee and the subsequent creditors. 55 This rule, designated as type II,
151. See method I(c). This seems to be the effect of a suggestion made by one com-
mentator. See Carey and Cilella, pra note 10, at 1020. Surprisingly, however, it seems
to have been intended as an application of the rule of marshalling.
152. This will always be true as compared with the "bankruptcy rule" of marshalling,
1(b), but will be true as compared with the "equity rule," 1(a), only when under the
latter rule preferred creditors may obtain 100' satisfaction without taking a full pro rata
share of the general estate; for since under the reverse marshalling method they will
take a full pro rata share, they would not need to avail themselves of all the mortgaged
property and a surplus would be left for the mortgagee.
153. An even more complete sacrifice of the rights of the disfavored creditors was ap-
parently contemplated by the lower federal courts in the case of Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4
(1931). The favored creditors were to be given 1009r, then the mortgagee was to get the
full amount of the mortgage, and the remaining assets were to be distributed to the credit-
ors against whom the mortgage was valid. Appellant's Brief, p. 5. This method is not re-
produced in the appended table, because no possible logical basis for it can be found.
154. See Steele v. Mansell, 6 Rich. L. 437, 453 (S. C. 1852). cited with approval in
In re Cannon, 121 Fed. 582 (D. S. C. 1903), note 146, supra.
155. This proposition enjoys the support of an authority. In re Myers, 24 F. (2d) 349
(C. C. A. 2d, 1928). Note, however, that this bankruptcy case would now probably
come under the rule of Moore v. Bay, 284 U. S. 4 (1931).
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varies from type I chiefly in giving the mortgagee a share of the mortgaged
property previously allocated exclusively to the preferred group.'50 The type
II rule is, of course, subject to the same variations as type I, with the same
tendencies apparent in each.
While the type II method diminishes the windfall which favored creditors
would receive under type I, it fails to take accurate account of the extent
to which the subsequent creditors have been harmed. The subsequent creditors
extended credit on the basis of an apparent state of facts, and it is only
necessary to recreate that state of facts as far as they are concerned in order
to do them justice. Since subsequent creditors expected that the mortgaged
property, as well as the general assets, would be distributed pro raoa to all
creditors, they should receive the share they would have had if this had
been the case.1 57 In the example chosen this is one third of the total assets
available, including the mortgaged property.158 The problem remains as to
the distribution between the mortgagee and the existing creditors. Clearly
the latter have no claim to any of the mortgaged property. On the other
hand the mortgagee is entitled to share in the general assets on the basis
of any deficiency in the satisfaction of his claim, just as he would have if
for any reason his security had fallen short of his claim. The procedure
for reaching this result is inevitably complicated. The mortgaged prop-
erty should be divided first, on the principle just outlined, the preferred
creditors taking, in the example, one third, the mortgagee the remaining two
thirds because the mortgage is valid as against the existing creditors. Then,
following the "bankruptcy rule", the mortgagee and the subsequent creditors
should prove the unpaid balance of their claims in the general estate' 0 together
156. There may be a further variation. Under the "equity rule" existing creditors
will be better off under type I if the subsequent creditors' claims can be satisfied without
taking a full pro rata share of the general assets, except when under both types I and II
subsequent creditors can be satisfied completely out of the mortgaged property. Compare
I(a) with 11(a). The occurrence of this exception is extremely improbable, for in
type II the subsequent creditors can be completely satisfied out of the mortgaged property
only if it is also sufficient to satisfy the mortgagee completely.
157. This was the rule applied by the referee who wvas reversed by the court in In re
Cannon, 121 Fed. 582 (D. S. C. 1903), note 146 stspra. See id. at 583. Since only mort-
gaged property was available, the mortgagee got the balance. See method III in situa-
tion C in the appended table.
158. It may thus be seen that in the type II methods as well as those of type I, the
preferred group is receiving more than it would have if there had been in fact been no
mortgage. Since this was the apparent situation on which it supposedly relied, it is
in effect receiving a premium for being-deceived.
159. In the unlikely event that the mortgaged property exceeds the mortgagees
claim, it should be divided between subsequent creditors and mortgagee only up to the
amount of the mortgagee's claim; the excess should be included in the "general estate."
Although admittedly the existing creditors will thereby be allowed to share in rart
of the mortgaged property, this is an inevitable consequence if the subsequent creditors
are to receive their actual damages and the existing creditors what they would have
had if the mortgage had been valid. In any event, except in certain extremely improbable
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with the existing creditors who prove their full claims. This will be seen
to effect the result that the existing creditors receive exactly what they would
have received if the mortgage had been valid, which it was as to them.1 °0
Thus they are not penalized by the failure of the mortgagee to record, which
would be -he effect if they received any less.161 Exactly the same result as
that here contemplated was reached by the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina,162 but the method of computation used, while fully as complicated, was
more in the nature of a "rule of thumb," and unless somewhat modified
might often give an improper result.10 The slight mistake made, however,
situations, the mortgagee will still get more than under any of the type I or type II
methods.
160. The reason for this result is as follows: If the mortgage had been valid, the
existing creditors would have shared pro rata in the general assets with the subsequent
creditors and the mortgagee to the extent of his claim which was not satisfied by the
mortgaged property. (In situation A, the mortgagee's claim would have been wholly
satisfied by the mortgaged property, hence he would not have had to share in the general
assets). In the method proposed, the mortgaged property is distributed between the
mortgagee and the subsequent creditors, and the subsequent creditors' claims in the gen-
eral assets are decreased by the same amount that the mortgagee's claim is increased.
Hence the total claims with which the existing creditors will share pro rata in the gen-
eral assets also remain the same.
It has seemed justifiable in reaching this result to assume that, if the mortgage had been
valid but the property had not wholly satisfied the mortgagee's claim, he would prove
in the general assets only on the basis of his deficiency claim, i.e., according to the
"bankruptcy rule." Accordingly, the system of talculation here employed would have
to be somewhat modified, if the "equity rule" were to prevail.
161. If the bankruptcy rule is employed, existing creditors receive the same in type I
and type II as they do in type III, except where the amount of the mortgaged property
exceeds the mortgagee's claim.
162. In re American Slicing Machine Co., 125 S. C. 214, 118 S. E. 303 (1923).
163. The computation was as follows: The percentage of subsequent creditors' claims
which they were to recover was ascertained by dividing the total assets including the
mortgaged property by the total claims including the mortgagee's claim. The percentage
of recovery for the existing creditors was determined by dividing the general assets by
the claims of the unsecured" creditors, i.e., the total claims less the mortgagee's claim.
The mortgagee was giVen the balance. This will give the right result only so long as the
mortgagee's claim is exactly equal to the value of the mortgaged property. For exam-
ple, if the mortgaged property has depreciated below the mortgagee's claim, the existitig
creditors will get too much at the expense of the mortgagee, for the method contemplates
no claim against the general estate by the mortgagee. This is readily demonstrable: In
situation B in the appended table, where the mortgaged property amounts only to $500,
according to the rule of the Slicing Machine case, each of the three groups of creditors
would get $500. This is the proper amount for the subsequent creditors, but obviously
something is wrong if the existing creditors get as much as each of the other two. A
correct result, however, can be assured if the rule is modified as followq: In calculating
the percentage of recovery for the existing creditorg. the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty (though only to the extent of the mortgagee's claim) should be deducted from the
total claims. Then the valur of the general assets (lhis any surphis mnrtgaged property)
should be divided by this amount. In the case supposed. this would give the existing cred-
itors 40% recovery, instead of 509c. or $400. See result in rule 1l, situation B.
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does not detract from an eminently intelligent decision, unique in its under-
standing of the issues involved.
The unrecorded mortgage situation, chosen here as most convenient and
complete for the purposes of illustration, is not exactly analogous to those
cases where the victim of the special claim has himself no bona fide claim
against the estate, as in the typical watered stock or fraudulent conveyance
cases. The problems that arise when the rule of equal distribution is not
followed in these situations, are similar to those already discussed and can
be dealt with along the same lines. They are simply not so complicated e4
For example, if the reasoning of rule III (actual damage) be employed, the
stockholders can be held only for the increment which would have been added
to the favored creditors' share if the estate had been as they expected it to
be.i65 In both situations, the favored creditors could be accurately compen-
sated by computing their pro rata share in the special claim just as if all
the other creditors were entitled to share in it. The remainder of the special
claim would be left to the transferee or stockholder' 00 Similarly, the type I
methods might be applied, in which case the favored creditors would be
given complete priority over the transferee or stockholder in the distribution
of the transferred assets. The effects of the different ways of marshalling
are the same: the "bankruptcy rule" benefits the disfavored creditors at the
expense of the favored group, while the reverse marshalling process, method
(c), is hardest on the disfavored group and easiest on the victim of the claim.
Since in these situations, neither the transferee nor the stockholder has a
claim against the estate, the type II methods are inapplicable, as there could
be no reason for ratable distribution between the claimant and his victim. An
illustrative table similar to that for the unrecorded mortgage situation appears
on the next page.
There being no inherent value in any of the rules of distribution outlined,
the choice of method can depend only on the individual attitude towards the
parties concerned. Again it seems that where the victim is a fraudulent
transferee or a stockholder-promoter who has consciously deceived the public,
type I(a) or (b) should be followed, for under these rules the favored
creditors receive complete priority over the transferee. On the other hand,
if the claim involves a small stockholder who in all good faith received some
bonus shares or a dividend which he has long since spent, the hardship of
imposing out-of-pocket liability may indicate that rule III should be applied
164. In no case will the transferee or stockholder be allowed to share in the general
assets.
165. Similarly, a transferee can be held only for the increment which would have been
added to the favored creditors' share if there had been no fraudulent conveyance.
166. Note, however, that in dividing the general assets the "equity rule" should here
be applied, since the "actual damage" method proceeds upon the assumption that the
disfavored creditors ought to receive only that to which their position entities them: a
pro rata share in the general assets.
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and the preferred creditors be given no more than the extent of actual damage
to them. There is, however, no ground for supposing that such a theory
has ever been applied in these fields, and in practice the probability is that
recovery would be along one of the more typical marshalling or type I rules.
The only remaining dispute then would be as to the relative merits of the
equity and bankruptcy rules for proving in the general assets. Of these the
"bankruptcy rule" is probably the better, since it does not overemphasize the
discrimination between the favored and disfavored group.
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(a) (b) 1000(c) 500
(actual damage rule) 500
(Equal distribution) 1000
(a) (c) 500(b) 666
(actual damage rule) 500
(Equal distribution) 750
(a) (b) (c) 0
(actual damage rule) 0
(Equal distribution) 250
Note: In the watered stock situation the position of subsequent and e.risting creditors
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